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GLOBAL PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: 
LESSONS FROM A NATIONAL MODEL OF 
SETTING STANDARDS IN ACCOUNTING 
WALTER MATTLI* & TIM BÜTHE** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous recent studies have documented the increase of global govern-
ance by international organizations, formal and informal transgovernmental 
networks, hybrid public–private institutional arrangements, and entirely private 
transnational institutions.1  These bodies establish general rules and make spe-
cific decisions with which other actors comply, based on the recognition by the 
latter of the authority of the former.2  In the domestic context, such rule- and 
decisionmaking authority is embedded in a system of administrative law, that is, 
a system of institutionalized procedural and substantive norms.  It assures those 
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 1.  See, e.g., Tim Büthe, Governance through Private Authority?  Non-State Actors in World Poli-
tics, 58 J. INT’L AFF. 281 (2004); GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN 
TRANSITION (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003); TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, 
A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).  Although most of these studies focus on the increased demand for 
global governance, the supply of governance institutions must also be explained.  See WALTER 
MATTLI, THE LOGIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND BEYOND (1999); DOUGLASS C. 
NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).  For a discussion of in-
ternationalization or transnationalization versus “globalization,” see DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE (1999).   For notational simplicity we will 
use “global” in this article even when social exchange or institutions may, strictly speaking, “only” be 
international or transnational. 
 2. Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, Globalization and Governance, in GOVERNANCE IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 7.  We concur with Kahler and Lake that recognition of authority 
may be based on coercive power, but that “governance” connotes compliance as such as being volun-
tary.  For a discussion of alternative notions of “governance,” see GOVERNANCE WITHOUT 
GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czem-
piel eds., 1992). 
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who are affected by the regulator’s decisions that they will enjoy “procedural 
participation” (that is, that their views will be heard and considered, for in-
stance through notice-and-comment procedures); that decisions will be taken in 
a transparent manner on the basis of disclosed reasons and in compliance with 
norms of proportionality, means–ends rationality, and the like; and that the de-
cisions are subject to review by a judicial or another independent body on re-
quest.3  In short, administrative law mechanisms ensure accountability.  They 
have a long history and tradition at the domestic level without an apparent 
counterpart at the international or global level.4  Yet globalization of rulemak-
ing need not necessarily entail losing such safeguards:  based on an extensive 
and detailed mapping of current administrative practice of global governance 
organizations and networks, Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart suggest that a 
global administrative law is not only possible but in the process of being cre-
ated, and they open a normative–prescriptive debate over the forms that global 
administrative law might take. 
We seek to contribute to this timely debate by presenting a positive political 
analysis of global governance, both theoretically and in a particular empirical 
context.  Such a positive analysis, we submit, should precede deliberation about 
which administrative norms and mechanisms can and should be instituted, be-
cause a discussion of effective remedies presupposes a clear understanding of 
actual deficiencies and their causes.  To gain such an understanding, we ask a 
series of analytical questions:  Why is rulemaking authority implicitly granted or 
explicitly delegated to an international or transnational body?  What are the 
consequences of such a delegation of authority for the domestic and interna-
tional distribution of power and resources (including information and exper-
tise)?  Why do some actors rather than others supply such governance?  Do all 
those who are affected in a given realm have a voice in the governance institu-
tion (and if not, why not)?  And what are the prospects for the comprehensive 
adoption and the likely effectiveness of administrative law procedures? 
Scholars of administrative law have tended to shy away from such questions, 
preferring detailed accounts of administrative procedures and normative dis-
course over positive political analysis.  Positive analysis, however, is very much 
needed:  lack of participation and accountability may be caused not just by ex-
clusion or non-transparent procedures, but also by ignorance, information defi-
cits, erroneous beliefs, or collective action dilemmas.  The creation of notice-
and-comment procedures, for example, will achieve little when the problem is 
ignorance or a lack of technical expertise by the subjects of a particular govern-
 
 3. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administra-
tive Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (Summer/Autumn 2005).  “Disclosed reasons” may of course 
be merely rationalizations.   
 4. Many of these core principles of administrative law seem to be grounded in democratic theory.  
See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985).  Therefore, they might 
only be found in full in democracies.  Yet, compare the distinction between participation-based and 
delegation-based notions of accountability in Ruth Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and 
Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29 (2005). 
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ance arrangement.  Greater procedural transparency and formal rules guaran-
teeing procedural inclusion of all affected parties may be in vain if those parties’ 
participation is in fact prevented by collective action problems.  Positive analy-
sis of new or changing administrative law mechanisms and procedures at both 
the national and global levels therefore also offers tools for assessing the effec-
tiveness and desirability of competing institutional designs for administrative 
law. 
Such an analysis and the above questions seem especially important when 
global governance is carried out by private regulatory bodies—because the 
“relatively effective means of intervention,” used domestically by democrati-
cally legitimated public bodies “to control or correct private governance,” are 
absent at the global level.5  Accountability has therefore been rightly noted as 
“the most difficult issue” when governance is provided by private actors.6  We 
consequently focus in this paper exclusively on the potential for administrative 
law to enhance transparency, access, and accountability in the realm of private 
transnational regulatory arrangements.  Deductively, we draw on a modified 
principal-agent theory, which we have developed in greater detail elsewhere,7 to 
offer an analytical account of private global governance that emphasizes princi-
pals and agents, as well as the macro-political context in which any particular 
principal-agent relationship is embedded.  To examine global private govern-
ance empirically, we focus on the little known but highly influential non-
governmental organization responsible for setting global accounting or “finan-
cial reporting” standards, the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB).8 
Accounting standards regulate how research and development expenses, 
performance incentives for managers such as stock options, assets in an em-
ployee pension fund, and other particular types of transactions and events may 
be reflected in corporate financial statements.  The standards are supposed to 
result in statements of a firm’s value and financial position, which are accurate 
and easily comparable across firms.  Seemingly technical, these standards create 
 
 5. Kingsbury et al., supra note 3, at 34. 
 6. VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 118 (2001).  For a broader discussion of issues of accountability 
in global governance, see Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Redefining Accountability for Global 
Governance, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 386-411. 
 7. Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Accountability in Accounting?  The Politics of Private Rule-making 
in the Public Interest, 18 GOVERNANCE 399 (July 2005); Tim Büthe, The Dynamics of Principals and 
Agents: Institutional Change and Persistence in Setting U.S. Accounting Standards, Mimeo (Duke Uni-
versity, 2005). 
 8. For an analysis of other major private-sector regulatory institutional bodies, namely the Inter-
national Organization of Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC), see Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or 
Primacy of Power?, 56 WORLD POL. 1 (2003).  For general discussions of the choice of various public, 
private, or hybrid governance arrangements, see Walter Mattli, Public and Private Governance in Set-
ting International Standards, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 1, at 199-225; 
Daniel Drezner, Who Rules? The Regulation of Globalization (2005) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with author). 
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incentives for firms to engage in some activities and to avoid others, as well as 
to choose particular means in pursuit of a given goal; they thus shape the behav-
ior of firms and consequently important aspects of a country’s political econ-
omy.  For various reasons discussed below, firms follow these rules in calculat-
ing and disclosing information like profits, costs, assets, liabilities, and revenues 
to their shareholders and to the general public.9 
The growth of stock ownership, transnational stock market listings, and 
more generally the increasing integration of financial markets over the last dec-
ade or two have intensified demands from firms and investors for the interna-
tional harmonization of divergent national accounting standards.  The growing 
demand for global accounting rules has led to a delegation of rulemaking au-
thority in accounting to a non-governmental body of technical experts, the 
IASB, funded by the business firms that “prepare” and “issue” financial state-
ments and by the accountancy profession.  IASB began operating in April 
2001.10  It was modeled on a homologous national private institution, the 
American Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which has been in 
charge of producing “generally accepted accounting principles” (GAAP) for 
the U.S. market for over thirty years.11 
Regulatory institutions like IASB and FASB, however, are not fixed struc-
tures.  They undergo and have undergone changes over time.  We focus here on 
an important dimension of change:  change in the extent to which these bodies 
have embraced, resisted, instituted, or rejected mechanisms of administrative 
law, such as transparency, participation, and the proclamation of reasons for 
their decisions.  We seek to explain such changes as well as the general opera-
tion of private-sector accounting governance as a function of political and struc-
tural factors, such as power, control, dependency, and knowledge asymmetries. 
Part II elaborates the analytical framework and makes the case for its appli-
cability to the realm of accounting standards-setting.  Parts III and IV apply the 
framework of private-sector governance to the American and global cases re-
spectively.  In part III we draw on the relatively long history of private rulemak-
ing in accounting in the United States to test a set of hypotheses about private-
sector governance.  Part IV turns to global private governance.  Since the IASB 
experience is too recent for comparable in-depth analysis, we consider the im-
plications of the preceding analysis for global private governance in accounting, 
based on the strong institutional affinity between FASB and IASB.  Part V con-
cludes by considering some of the implications of our analysis for attempts to 
improve transnational regulatory governance through administrative law pro-
cedures at the global level. 
 
 9. For a concise discussion of the key reasons for having standards for financial reporting, see 
David Solomons, The Political Implications of Accounting and Accounting Standards Setting, 13 ACCT. 
BUS. RES. 107 (1983). 
 10. IASB replaced an institutionally weaker predecessor hailing back to the early 1970s, the Inter-
national Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). 
 11. Domestically, FASB accounting standards are binding based on the regulatory authority dele-
gated to the SEC by Congress. 
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II 
PRINCIPAL–AGENT THEORY AND PRIVATE REGULATORY GOVERNANCE12 
Principal–Agent Theory (P-A) is a fruitful starting point for an analysis of 
private governance, because it was developed for the very purpose of capturing 
essential characteristics of situations in which rule- or decisionmaking authority 
in a specified domain is conditionally granted by one actor (the “principal”) to 
another (the “agent”).13  P-A adopts the core assumptions of rational choice 
(RC) theory,14 but differs from most RC approaches in that its starting assump-
tion is that information is neither complete nor perfect because transactions—
including the writing of detailed contracts and the monitoring of agents—are 
costly.15  Delegation thus inevitably creates some discretion for the agent, which 
gives rise to the “agency problem” of “shirking” when the principal’s and the 
agent’s interests do not coincide, and the agent therefore acts contrary to the 
principal’s interests after authority has been delegated to the agent.  Account-
ability is therefore a central issue for P-A. 
P-A also is a promising starting point for our analysis because delegation of 
regulatory authority has been the focus of much of the P-A literature.  While 
the initial delegation of authority from citizens to legislators and governments 
surely warrants critical analysis,16 most of this literature has focused on delega-
tion from legislatures to specialized bureaucracies, mostly in the United States17 
but recently also comparatively,18 and from domestic elected officials to interna-
tional governmental organizations.19  While this literature has yielded numerous 
 
 12. Parts II and III draw in large part on Mattli and Büthe, supra note 7. 
 13. For a recent review of the literature, see Jonathan Bendor et al., Theories of Delegation, 4 
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 235 (2001); see also DARREN HAWKINS ET AL., DELEGATION UNDER ANARCHY: 
STATES, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY (forthcoming 2006). 
 14. See Barry R. Weingast, Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives, in A NEW 
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 167 (Robert E. Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds., 1996). 
 15. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985). 
 16. See generally Torbjörn Bergman et al., Parliamentary Democracy and the Chain of Delegation, 
37 EUR. J. POL. RES. 255, 255-429 (2000).  There is also, of course, an extensive literature on delegation 
within legislatures.  E.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of 
Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 86 (1988); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry Weingast, Positive 
Theories of Congressional Institutions, 19 LEG. STUD. Q. 145 (1994). 
 17. E.g., Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?  Presidential 
Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-
Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J. L. ECON. ORG. 119 (1996); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administra-
tive Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. ORG. 243 (1987); see also Terry M. 
Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
1094 (1985). 
 18. E.g., JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION?  THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002); MARK POLLACK, ENGINES 
OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY AND AGENDA-SETTING IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (2003); Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet, Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-
Majoritarian Institutions, 25 W. EUR. POL. 1 (2002). 
 19. E.g., Erica R. Gould, Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund 
Conditionality, 57 INT’L ORG. 551 (2003); Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to Inter-
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insightful analyses of delegation of governance authority to public bureaucra-
cies and regulatory agencies, the delegation of governance functions to private 
agents has so far largely been overlooked by P-A.  Yet, in recent years states 
have increasingly delegated domestic and international governance functions to 
private (non-governmental) actors, as novel forms of economic activities arose 
(e.g., internet commerce), increasing technical complexity required technical 
expertise that states found too costly to acquire and maintain (e.g., new finan-
cial instruments, bond ratings), and neoliberal ideas undercut the presumption 
of, and normative justification for, public provision of governance.20  We there-
fore focus our analysis on the delegation of governance authority to private 
agents. 
A. Why Delegate Authority to a Private Agent? 
The P-A literature has identified several reasons for political principals to 
delegate rule- and decisionmaking authority to agents.  The probably most gen-
eral and common reason for delegation is to reduce the principal’s workload 
and enable greater efficiency through specialization.21  This logic is at the heart 
of almost any employer–employee relationship.  It plays some role in most dele-
gation of regulatory authority, domestically and globally, but at this general 
level that role is relatively uninteresting for the present analysis.  Three more 
specific reasons for delegation, however, warrant closer examination, because 
each of them may make delegation of governance functions to a private agent 
particularly attractive, and because they have important implications for (the 
feasibility of) administrative law mechanisms. 
One specific reason for delegating authority is the desire to benefit from ex-
isting specialization and expertise as a substitute for acquiring such expertise 
through lengthy and costly training.22  Such delegation to an agent with prior 
specialized expertise is particularly common in highly technical and complex is-
sue areas, for instance in the fields of science policy and space technology.23  In 
such technical fields, regulatory authority may be established more cost-
effectively by delegating authority to a private expert-agent insofar as it is pri-
vate actors who have the requisite expertise ex ante. 
Second, and more generally, the maintenance of specialized expertise may 
make delegation to a private agent more efficient and therefore more desirable 
 
national Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241 
(2003). 
 20. See, e.g., Susan Strange, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE 
WORLD ECONOMY (1996); Alfred C. Aman, Administrative Law for a New Century, in 
GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE, 267, 272 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds., 1999); 
PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999); see also 
Büthe, supra note 1. 
 21. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST 
POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 48 (1999). 
 22. James E. Alt & Alberto Alesina, Political Economy: An Overview, in A NEW HANDBOOK OF 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 645, 658 (Robert E. Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds. 1996). 
 23. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 21, at 5, 196. 
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than delegation to a public agent.  Governments and public agencies, which can 
use the specialized expertise solely for the purpose of regulation, will find main-
taining such expertise more costly than will private actors, who can derive posi-
tive externalities from this expertise by also using it to improve products, proc-
esses, and so forth.  This economic rationale underpins the efficiency arguments 
for industry self-regulation.24 
Expertise-based motivations for delegation have direct implications for the 
effectiveness of administrative law mechanisms to ensure participation and ac-
countability.  If the public principal lacks the technical expertise that would be 
required to provide governance we might expect it to be also poorly positioned 
to exercise oversight and to correct private regulatory decisions when they are 
not in the public interest.25   Moreover, we should expect the establishment of 
provisions for broad participation in the governance process, such as notice-
and-comment procedures, to have limited effectiveness if the technical expertise 
is unevenly distributed across those with a stake in (that is, those affected by) 
the regulatory agent’s rule- and decisionmaking. 
Among the general reasons for delegation, the third reason that creates par-
ticular incentives for delegating governance functions to private agents, is 
“blame avoidance” or “shifting responsibility.”26  From the perspective of a po-
litical actor who may provide or delegate regulatory governance, we can distin-
guish between the benefits that arise from satisfied stakeholders giving him 
credit for the positive effects of regulation and, conversely, the costs that arise 
from dissatisfied stakeholders blaming him for the negative effects.  Delegation 
creates a perceptual political “distance” between the political actor and the ap-
parent exercise of regulatory authority, which may be expected to reduce both 
benefits and costs for the political actor.  Delegation becomes attractive for the 
political actor if the political costs decline faster with distance than the political 
benefits, such that the net benefit increases with distance.  Under these condi-
tions, delegation to a private agent should be especially appealing because pri-
vate agents are (or at least appear) more clearly separate from the public prin-
cipal than public agents.27 
 
 24. See, e.g., HAUFLER, supra note 6, at 3, 10, 20. 
 25. We will discuss this issue in more detail below. 
 26. Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative 
Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33,  46 (1982). 
 27. For clarification, these conditions may be formally summarized as follows: 
 
  
∂BR,P (χ)
∂χ < 0   ;    
∂CR,P (χ)
∂χ < 0   
  UR,P = (BR,P −CR,P ) = f (χ,⋅)  ;    
∂UR,P (χ)
∂χ > 0   
 
where χ is the distance between the political actor and the exercise of regulatory authority.  BR,P(χ) is 
the (expected) benefit of regulation to the political actor, that is, the benefit of gratitude from satisfied 
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This has important implications for administrative law.  When shifting re-
sponsibility is an important motivation for delegation, procedures that enhance 
agent accountability to the principal—or ensure easy review and revision of the 
agent’s decisions—actually diminish the desired effect of delegation by dimin-
ishing the perceived political distance between the principal and the exercise of 
regulatory authority.  The implementation of such procedures should therefore 
be of little interest to the principal, and might even be resisted by her. 
B. Governance and Accountability After the Initial Delegation 
We have so far focused on some of the key reasons for delegating govern-
ance functions to a private actor in the first place.  But how do such private 
regulators differ from public ones in how they operate and evolve institutionally 
after authority has been delegated to them? 
The key difference between delegation to public agents and delegation to 
private agents is that delegation to private agents creates a multiple-principals 
problem.  Potential private agents are almost always collective actors—firms, 
private associations, maybe the science and technology advisory committees of 
labor unions or environmental groups—that have an immediate and prior prin-
cipal in their owners, members, or funders.  When public regulatory authority is 
delegated to such a private actor, then this agent has at least two principals, one 
public and one private. 
The P-A literature traditionally treats the multiple principals problem as a 
problem of collective action or free riding:  Since monitoring is costly and any 
principal would have to share at least part of the benefits of her efforts with 
others, close monitoring is less likely when the agent has multiple principals 
than when the agent has only a single principal.  The agent thus attains a higher 
level of discretion and will work less hard—what Wolfgang Müller calls “leisure 
shirking.”28  When the private principal, however, pursues the interests of only 
one segment of the general public and only one group of stakeholders, then we 
should expect “dissent shirking” of the agent vis-à-vis the public principal be-
cause the private principal induces a systematic divergence of the agent’s sub-
stantive preferences from the public principal’s preferences. 
This qualitatively different type of multiple principals problem, which arises 
from the delegation to a private agent, may be brought out most clearly in a 
very simple spatial model.  Assume that the public principal (P) seeks to bal-
ance the interests of two groups of stakeholders (SH1 and SH2), so P’s ideal 
 
stakeholders, which is a function of the distance χ (and other variables).  CR,P(χ) is the (expected) cost 
of regulation to the political actor, that is, the cost of being blamed by dissatisfied stakeholders, which 
also is a function of χ (and other variables).  B(χ=0) and C(χ=0) are assumed to be greater than zero.  
UR,P(χ) is the overall utility (net benefit) derived from regulatory governance by the political actor 
(public principal). This logic motivates delegation inter alia in politically charged contexts, in which 
regulatory activity may be more palatable for the regulated when carried out by an agent who is clearly 
separate from the principal, rather than being carried out directly by the principal. 
 28. Wolfgang C. Müller, Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and 
Accountability Work, 37 EUR. J. POL. RES. 309, 320 (2000). 
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point is somewhere between the ideal points of the stakeholders on any particu-
lar regulatory or institutional issue (see Figure 1).  Unless we assume uneven 
distribution of political lobbying resources between the two stakeholders, we 
have no reason to expect a public agent to take a position on either side of the 
public principal (leisure shirking as such is random with respect to X).  But if a 
private agent has one—but not the other— stakeholder as an additional princi-
pal (for instance, SH1), then we would expect regulatory policy or governance 
decisions by the agent to favor this stakeholder systematically (i.e., they will 
tend to fall between P and SH1).  This model of delegation to a private agent 
therefore implies that one group of stakeholders will benefit from private gov-
ernance at another group’s expense.29 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Ideal Points for Simple Regulatory Delegation Scenario 
 
 
 
 29. We do not mean to make too much of this difference:  in the real world, public regulatory 
agencies can get captured by those whom they are supposed to regulate.  See George Stigler, The The-
ory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).  And as Epstein and O’Halloran 
point out, legislators (as the public principals of the regulatory agencies) themselves may also be very 
receptive to special interest lobbying when making regulatory decisions. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, su-
pra note 21, at 10; see also Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J. L. 
ECON. ORG. 213 (1990).  When any one group has privileged access, we would expect the regulatory 
activity to favor the interests of that group, regardless of whether this was the intention of the institu-
tional arrangement or an unintentional by-product.  See McCubbins et al., supra note 17, at 261; see also 
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements 
and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); Glen O. Robinson, Commentary on 
“Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Political Uses of Structure and 
Process, 75 VA. L. REV. 483 (1989).  Note also that we do not argue that the involvement of non-
governmental principals inherently diminishes the effectiveness or efficiency of regulation.  Not all pub-
lic policy decisions significantly affect everyone.  If the private principals reflect without bias the bal-
ance of interests among those who have a stake in the regulatory matter, public and private benefits 
should coincide (though there might be less need for regulation under these circumstances).  Moreover, 
with the right socio-political incentives, a high degree of independence seems to be quite possible:  
Highly institutionalized professional norms appear to provide effective incentives, for instance, for 
former senior partners in corporate law firms to become quite independent judges after appointment, 
or for national policy experts to largely disregard their own countries’ policy preference after joining 
the European Commission bureaucracy.  Finally, a full analysis of outcomes (rather than preferences) 
might require additional contextual information. 
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But where should we expect the outcome to fall between P and SH1 when 
the two principals’ preferences diverge?  The assumption of instrumental ra-
tionality on the part of the agent leads us to expect that this will be a function of 
the relative tightness of the P-A relationships between each of the principals 
and the agent, which in turn is a function of the relative importance of the prin-
cipals for the agent’s financial and operational viability as well as for its effec-
tiveness in rulemaking.   
Financial viability refers to the availability of the financial resources re-
quired for the agent to fund its operations.  Unless the agent is funded entirely 
out of an endowment it controls itself the agent will have strong incentives to 
take the interests of its funders into account.  The more the agent depends on 
its private principal for its financial viability, ceteris paribus, the tighter should 
be the P-A relationship between the agent and the private principal.  In terms 
of Figure 1, the outcome would be expected to be closer to SH1.  Conversely, 
the more the agent depends on a periodic discretionary allocation of resources 
from the public principal for its financial viability, the tighter should be the P-A 
relationship between the agent and the public principal (outcome closer to P). 
Operational viability refers to the availability of the technical expertise re-
quired for the agent to carry out the governance tasks delegated to it.  The 
World Anti-Doping Agency, for instance, requires medical and bio-chemical 
scientific expertise and instruments (as well as expertise for making ethical 
judgments and improving education about prohibited substances) to carry out 
the governance of the “fair play” provisions of the World Anti-Doping Code, 
including monitoring compliance by all athletes in the Olympics and other 
sports that have adopted the code.30  How do regulatory agents acquire the 
needed expertise and technical support?  As we suggested above, the prior exis-
tence of the requisite expertise among private actors is likely to be a key reason 
for having delegated to a private agent in the first place.31  If private provision of 
such expertise is crucial to the agent’s operational viability, outcomes favoring 
those providing this crucial resource should be expected.  Specifically, the more 
the agent depends on the private principal for the provision of such expertise, 
the closer should the outcome be to SH1. 
While ensuring its own financial and operational viability may be the agent’s 
first concern, effectiveness as a regulator also needs to be of central importan-
tance.  Effectiveness here refers foremost to gaining acceptance for, and com-
pliance with, the rules and decisions it issues.  To gain an analytical handle on 
the issue of effectiveness, we depart from traditional P-A by recognizing explic-
itly that any particular principal-agent relationship is “embedded” in a broader 
context of norms and ideas32—the “macro-political” climate or “mood.”33 
 
 30. See http://www.wada-ama.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2005); Kingsbury et al., supra note 3, at 46. 
 31. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24. 
 32. See MARK BLYTH, GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS: ECONOMIC IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: 
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (1957); John Gerard Ruggie, International 
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The macro-political climate defines inter alia the “proper” relationship be-
tween public authority and private actors, which appears to have undergone 
several changes over the course of the twentieth century in the advanced capi-
talist democracies.34  In the United States, for instance, there have been ex-
tended periods of an exuberantly pro-business macro-political climate that ren-
dered any increase in regulation and even the then-current levels of government 
regulation of the private sector virtually illegitimate (most notably in the 1920s, 
1950s, 1980s, and 1990s).  Each of these periods was followed by a period during 
which the mood was almost hostile to business and during which it was seen as 
nearly unacceptable for business to regulate itself.35  Such swings in the public 
mood make a private principal who appears to have notably diverged from the 
public preference vulnerable to challenges.  It also opens opportunities for insti-
tutional change,36 maybe even a revision of the principal–agent relationship, 
forced on the agent by the public principal.  More likely, though, a private agent 
who values his discretion will react to such a change in the macro-political cli-
mate by modifying its procedures before being forced to do so by a public prin-
cipal.  Change in the macro-political climate thus creates an opening for the in-
troduction or strengthening of administrative law procedures, such as greater 
transparency, the establishment of public comment-and-notice periods, and the 
like.37 
C. Applicability of P-A to Governance in Accounting 
Before turning to the question whether the hypotheses developed above are 
empirically supported in the realm of accounting governance, it is worth exam-
ining whether this issue area is suitable for an application of the analytical 
framework developed above.  Indeed, the specific reasons for delegating gov-
ernance to a private actor apply in the realm of accounting.  Accounting stan-
dards are complex, technical, and have been fast-changing in recent decades, as 
 
Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, in 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 195 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); Kathleen R. McNamara, Rational Fic-
tions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation, 25 W. EUR. POL. 47 (2002). 
 33. See, e.g., ROBERT S. ERIKSON ET AL., THE MACRO POLITY 325 (2002). 
 34. See, e.g., David Vogel, The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and 
Environmental Regulation in Europe, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 557 (2003). 
 35. See DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN 
AMERICA (1989). 
 36. See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
(2004); Büthe, supra note 7; see also Kingsbury et al., supra note 3, at 35-40. 
 37. Substantial rather than merely cosmetic institutional or behavioral change in response to 
changes in the macro-climate, however, should not be expected to be automatic.  As Wood and 
Waterman note, when signals from principals or the political environment conflict with the interests of 
a bureaucracy, “it is natural for bureaucracies to react slowly.”  Dan B. Wood & Richard W. Water-
man, The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 497 (1993).  This expecta-
tion should apply to private as well as public bureaucracies.  Regulatory agents may react to such 
changes in the political macro-climate in recognition that it changes their constraints, but we should ex-
pect to see far-reaching changes in the formal institutions or regularized behavior of regulatory agents 
only when public principals translate the change in the macro climate into specific incentives for agent 
adaptation. 
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new financial instruments were invented and their accounting treatment needed 
to be clarified.  While there are public demands for the regulation of financial 
reporting, very few if any government employees have the requisite technical 
expertise.  And while experts might be trained or hired, it would be very costly 
for career public servants (necessary if government bureaucracies were to carry 
out the standards-setting functions) to maintain such expertise, because they 
would not be participants in the private financial markets in which innovation in 
financial instruments is taking place.  Expertise-based incentives for delegation 
to a private regulatory agent thus clearly exist.  Moreover, disagreements over 
accounting standards appear to be grounded often in conflicts of interests with 
little room for mutually beneficial solutions,38 such that the regulator is bound to 
leave some groups and individuals with a stake in the regulatory matter dissatis-
fied with the outcome.39  It thus appears to be an area in which blame from dis-
satisfied stakeholders is likely to exceed the gratitude from satisfied ones, at 
least for those directly exercising regulatory authority.  As the Financial Times 
recently observed:  “Setting accounting standards is no way to make friends.”40 
These characteristics of accounting governance create strong incentives to 
delegate governance to private agents at both the domestic and the global level.  
And indeed, accounting standards-setting is one of the governance functions 
that has been delegated to private agents within several countries as well as in-
ternationally.  Our analytical framework also seems suitable in that the public 
agencies that are charged with regulating stock markets and financial reporting 
(be they central banks, securities commissions, or other agencies) may be seen 
as constituting an explicit or implicit public principal to the private agent at the 
domestic level, though who constitutes the public principal at the international 
or global level warrants separate analysis.41  We have also suggested above that 
expertise-based private agents should be expected to have, by design, a prior 
private principal; we will examine this proposition below.42 
Finally, mapping preferences in a space populated by several stakeholders 
also seems appropriate for the analysis of accounting standards-setting.  The 
content of these standards matters to the firms that issue financial securities and 
therefore prepare financial statements (the “preparers”), but several other 
groups also have a stake in what these standards prescribe:  Investors seeking 
information about alternative investment opportunities are probably the most 
important type of “users” of financial statements, and accounting professionals 
must keep up with the latest developments both for keeping and for auditing 
the books of firms. 
 
 38. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING 
IN 56 (2d ed. 1991). 
     39. See infra text accompanying notes 56. 
 40. Barney Jopson, Key Performance Ratio Finds that Its Numbers May Be Up, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 
2005, at 16. 
     41. See infra Part IV. 
     42. See infra text accompanying notes 55-57, 92-95, 103.  
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We have suggested that the tightness of a P-A relationship is a function of 
the relative importance of the principal for the agent’s financial viability and 
operational viability, as well as (indirectly) a function of what we have called 
the macro-political climate.  Financial viability is straightforward and should be 
applicable in the analysis of any regulatory agent.  Operational viability, in the 
realm of setting accounting standards, refers to having (or lacking) general ac-
counting expertise, familiarity with existing financial instruments, and knowl-
edge of current practices.  The regulatory agent needs this expertise to write ac-
counting standards that are feasible in implementation as well as effective in 
achieving the goals of completeness and comparability of financial reporting.  
Finally, changes in the macro-political climate should be expected to bear on at-
titudes toward the regulation of financial reporting, not just because it is an in-
stance of the more general phenomenon of government regulation of private 
actors, but also because accounting fraud and—maybe more importantly—
technically legal but fundamentally misleading accounting practices have been 
seen as essential components of the spectacular corporate wrongdoing at Enron 
and some other major corporations, contributing to the perception of a failure 
of the self-governing market.  In sum, the analytical framework developed 
above seems suitable for a positive political analysis of accounting standards-
setting. 
III 
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS IN U.S. ACCOUNTING GOVERNANCE 
The setting of accounting standards in the United States provides an oppor-
tunity to analyze empirically the delegation of governance functions to private 
actors in one of the few cases in which such delegation has a long history.  To 
hold the institutional context broadly constant,43 we focus on the period after 
the 1972/73 reforms of U.S. accounting standards-setting and on episodes in 
which divergent interests of the stakeholders can be well established, based on 
existing sources and on interviews that we have conducted with individuals in-
volved with accounting standards issues in American corporations, at the 
FASB, and at the SEC. 
A. The Structure of Private-Sector Accounting Standardization 
While some individual states had regulated the issuance and trading of fi-
nancial securities already in the late 1700s, Congress asserted the authority of 
the federal government to regulate financial securities only in the 1930s.  It did 
so in response to the stock market crash that saw the Dow Jones Industrial Av-
erage lose ninety percent of its October 1929 valuation—attributed in part to 
“trick money” and “shenanigan” accounting, and more generally to misleading 
and “deceptive” financial reporting practices, facilitated by the “extraordinary 
 
 43. Cf. Tim Büthe, Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use of Narratives as 
Evidence, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV.  481 (2002). 
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diversity [of the] appearance, size, content, and intent” of financial statements.44  
More generally, Congress hereby reacted to the Depression-induced swing in 
the macro-political climate, reflected in the election of 1932.  The Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 mandated “full and fair disclo-
sure” in the flotation of financial securities, required that periodic financial 
statements be filed by the issuers of publicly traded securities, and created the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to which it delegated the task of 
specifying and enforcing all obligations arising from these two acts.  Starting in 
1938, the SEC—itself a public agency—further delegated the authority “to pre-
scribe the methods to be followed in the preparation of accounts and the form 
and content of financial statements to be filed”45 to a private body.  This delega-
tion of authority was controversial at the time, but it persisted, with the SEC it-
self retaining an oversight function and final authority, which makes it the direct 
public principal for the private agent.  The first and second such private ac-
counting standards-setting bodies—the Committee on Accounting Procedure 
(1934-1959) and the Accounting Principles Board (1959-1973)46—were replaced 
in 1973 by a novel institutional structure that is largely in place to this day and 
provided the model for the global private regulator.  This structure consists of 
three bodies: the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB), and the Financial Accounting Standards 
Advisory Council (FASAC).47 
The FAF is composed of trustees whose task it is to appoint the members of 
FASB and to exercise general oversight.  They are also responsible for raising 
funds—until recently primarily from business—to pay for FASB salaries and 
expenditures.  Trustees are elected for three-year terms and are eligible for re-
election to one additional term.48 
 
 44. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 198, 216, 162 (1927). 
 45. Accounting Series Release No.150 (Dec. 20, 1973) (reprinted in, for example, Douglas C. 
Michael, LEGAL ACCOUNTING: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 41-43 (1997)). 
 46. The institutional evolution of U.S. accounting standards-setting, which we examine in greater 
detail elsewhere, is beyond the scope of this article.  See also PAUL B. W. MILLER ET AL., THE FASB: 
THE PEOPLE, THE PROCESS, AND THE POLITICS 55-58 (4th ed. 1998). 
 47. A fourth institutional body, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), was 
added in 1984.  GASB sets standards of financial accounting and reporting for state and local govern-
mental units. 
 48. Each of the five original sponsoring organizations of the new standard-setting structure nomi-
nated one or more of the nine trustees of the Foundation.  Besides the AICPA, these organizations in-
cluded the American Accounting Association (AAA), the professional organization of accounting edu-
cators; the Financial Executives Institute (FEI); the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF, now the 
Association for Investment Management and Research, or AIMR); and the National Association of 
Accountants (NAA, now the Institute of Management Accountants, IMA).  In 1976, the Securities In-
dustry Association (SIA) joined this group of sponsoring organizations.  The latest additions are the 
National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers as well as the Government Fi-
nance Officers Associations.  The Foundation’s original trustees were the heads of three large national 
public accounting firms, two regional accounting firms, an investment banker, an accounting professor, 
and two executives from large U.S. corporations.  By the mid-1990s, the number of trustees had risen to 
sixteen.  Trustees have tended to represent and promote the interests of their sponsors. 
112905 08_MATTLIBUTHE.DOC 1/30/2006  3:17:27 PM 
Summer/Autumn 2005] GLOBAL PRIVATE GOVERNANCE 239 
The central operating body of the new standard-setting system is FASB.  Its 
seven members are all salaried and serve full-time for five-year terms with pos-
sible reappointment for a second term.49  FASB’s members usually are certified 
public accountants (CPAs) or experts from other relevant disciplines “who in 
the judgment of the trustees are well versed in problems of financial report-
ing.”50  They work with task forces of FASB employees and outside experts to 
draft standards. 
FASB’s mission, structure, operations, and relations with external groups 
are reviewed by the FAF every three to five years, typically generating recom-
mendations for institutional and procedural changes.  In response to such rec-
ommendations and to earlier complaints about a lack of transparency and ac-
countability, FASB has developed rules of procedure that are supposed to 
guarantee to all stakeholders an opportunity for participation and to ensure due 
process for any proposals or objections they submit.51  So-called “sunshine” re-
forms in 1977 increased public access to deliberations and to the records of 
FASB and its task forces and set up the regular publication of plans for techni-
cal projects.52  Later changes in FASB’s procedures have further enshrined 
many of the norms and practices of administrative law within this body of pri-
vate governance, albeit sometimes against resistance.53  Among these proce-
dures are provisions for the publication of “discussion memoranda” and “expo-
sure drafts” for comment before FASB’s vote on the “final draft” proposals. 
The third institutional pillar of the new standard-setting scheme is the 
FASAC, designed to be broadly representative of groups interested in or af-
fected by accounting standards.54  Meeting on a quarterly basis, its members—
also selected by the FAF—liaise with FASB on technical issues.  The FASAC 
 
 49. Each member has to sever all connections with prior employers and to divest him- or herself of 
all investments or other financial arrangements that might create conflicts of interest. 
 50. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOUNDATION, BYLAWS, chpt. A, art. II-A, section 2 (1973).  The 
members of the first Board included the president of AICPA and three senior accountants from 
Haskins & Sells (now part of Deloitte & Touche), Price Waterhouse, and Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & 
Co.  The other three members were a former chief of the office of Accounting and Finance of the 
Federal Power Commission, a comptroller of Exxon Corporation, and an accounting professor.  The 
current board consists of five accountants (including one with past positions in investment banking and 
as a business school professor of accounting), one former comptroller of a major oil corporation, and 
one accounting professor.  See http://www.fasb.org/facts/bd_members_ staff.shtml (last visited Aug. 26, 
2004). 
 51. STEPHEN MEZIAS & SEUNGWHA CHUNG, THE PROCESS AND PARTICIPATION AT FASB: A 
STUDY OF THE COMMENT PERIOD (1989); MILLER ET AL., supra note 46, at 59. 
 52. Other changes included changing the voting rule for adoption of FASB standards from a su-
permajority of at least 5-2 to a simple majority of 4-3 (requirements for passing proposals changed sev-
eral times over the last three decades; see note 70 and accompanying text below), placing a limit on an-
nual contributions from any given firm, doubling the technical staff, and consolidating the staff in a 
single Research and Technical Activities Division. 
      53.   See infra text accompanying notes 84-90. 
 54. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 46, at 43.  FASAC was originally comprised in 1973 of some 
twenty experts from the fields of finance, accounting, industry, education, banking, and the legal pro-
fession.  By the 1990s, FASAC counted about thirty members, about half of which were representatives 
of “preparers” (that is, publicly listed companies).  See http://www.fasb.org/fasac/fasacmem.shtml (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
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has to be heard, but its requests and recommendations need not be taken into 
account, and—in contrast to the procedural standards of contemporary admin-
istrative law—FASB need not explain any decision not to take them into ac-
count. 
The post-1972 structure of U.S. accounting standards-setting was, in effect, a 
bold experiment in self-regulation, which—like any form of administrative gov-
ernance—has both legislative and judicial qualities.55  It also closely resembles 
the principal-agent model developed above.  The key body of the new scheme, 
FASB, may be understood as an agent with two principals: on the one hand, the 
FAF, which funds FASB and selects its members, and, on the other, the SEC, a 
public regulator whose grant of authority confers the weight of federal law on 
FASB standards.  FASB (and its public principal, the SEC) operates in an issue-
space populated by three main groups of stakeholders:  business, accountants, 
and investors.56  Each group is bound to be divided over some issues, but on 
many other aspects of accounting standards the members of each group have a 
coherent ordering of preferences, which allows us to treat each group analyti-
cally as a single actor. 
We derived three key hypotheses from our theoretical model of delegation 
to a private agent in part II: that the agent will seek regulatory outcomes that 
favor the interests of the stakeholders represented by the private principal over 
the interests of stakeholders only represented by the public principal; that spe-
cific outcomes will be a function of the relative tightness of the competing P-A 
relationships; and that the likelihood of adoption of administrative law proce-
dures, as well as their effectiveness if adopted, will be limited in this kind of 
multiple principals setting, as a function of the initial reasons for delegation to a 
private agent.  All of this should be most apparent when the major groups have 
diametrically opposed preferences over a particular issue in accounting stan-
dards and standardization, leading to tensions and sometimes open conflicts 
over the control of private-sector rulemaking.  To the extent that its members 
are able to overcome their collective action problems, any group should be ex-
pected to push its agenda by using its available means to pressure the agent, 
FASB, as well as the principals.  Yet, we should see the business constituency—
that is, corporations preparing and issuing financial statements—be more influ-
ential than the other groups because it is business that provides financial and 
operational viability to the agent, FASB, via FASB’s private principal, FAF.  
Business thus resembles SH1 in the Figure 1 above. 
How do FASB’s dual loyalties affect its operation and institutional struc-
ture?  The remainder of section III will address this question by examining the 
 
 55. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 3, at 3.  The accounting standards-setting process is legislative 
in that it "establishes authoritative rules consistent with a legislative mandate; it is judicial because it 
interprets its own rules.”  Don Kirk in ROBERT VAN RIPER, SETTING STANDARDS FOR FINANCIAL 
REPORTING: FASB AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF A CRITICAL PROCESS 178 (1994). 
 56. Donald Kirk, Address at the Business Council, FASB VIEWPOINT at 2 (Nov. 9, 1979); see also 
MILLER ET AL., supra note 46, at 16. 
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competing pressures on FASB and the principals, including changes in the spe-
cific preferences of FASB and its principals, and the relationship between agent 
and principals. 
B. FASB and Business Groups 
The viability of FASB depends foremost on continuing support from busi-
ness groups—especially large companies with the requisite resources and exper-
tise available within the firm.  These groups willingly support FASB as long as it 
is effective in keeping government regulation at bay and as long as they feel 
that their preferences are understood and acted upon by the agent.57 
When business feels that FASB is out of step with its preferences, it criti-
cizes FASB for allegedly being overly committed to theory at the expense of 
practicality and ease of implementation, working too slowly and on the wrong 
projects, producing rules that are too complex, or being insufficiently sensitive 
to the cost of new standards to business.58 
Business can resort to a variety of strategies to push its demands.  For thirty 
years, the funding of FASB was raised by the FAF from voluntary donations.  
The bulk of the funding for FASB therefore has until recently come from busi-
ness groups.  When dissatisfied with FASB decisions, business has often re-
minded the agent that its continued financial viability depended on business’s 
continuing contributions.59  However, this financing arrangement has now 
changed.  In the wake of recent accounting scandals, questions were raised in 
Congress and beyond about the impact of the funding structure on the inde-
pendence of FASB as a regulatory agent.  In August 2003, a new funding struc-
ture, initiated under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was implemented.60  Under the 
new scheme, FASB’s budget is paid by mandatory contributions of some 7,500 
publicly listed companies.  This change from voluntary to mandated funding has 
removed one important means of pressure from business.61 
The business constituency also relies on the services of groups such as the 
Business Roundtable, an influential and by-invitation-only lobby group whose 
members are about 150 (current and some former) chief executives of the larg-
est U.S. companies across industries and geographic regions.  The Roundtable, 
founded in 1972, established in the late 1970s an Accounting Principles Task 
Force (APTF, today part of the Roundtable’s Corporate Governance Task 
 
 57. MILLER ET AL., supra note 46; Laurence Minard, Lower the Red Flag?, FORBES, June 12, 1978, 
at 95; Paulette R. Tandy and Nancy L. Wilburn, Constituent Participation in Standard-Setting: The 
FASB's First 100 Statements, 6 ACCT. HORIZONS 47, 47 (June 1992). 
 58. MILLER ET AL., supra note 46; VAN RIPER, supra note 55; Randy Howard, Kudos for the 
FASB, 169 J OF ACCOUNTANCY (May 1990) at 15. 
 59. This risk was noted early on.  See, e.g., Stephen A. Zeff, The Rise of “Economic Consequences,” 
146 J. ACCT. 60 n.25 (1978). 
 60. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title 1, §109 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 61. Several private-sector players interviewed have expressed concern that the new funding struc-
ture may move FASB closer to government and make it more susceptible to political interference. 
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Force), made up of heads of major companies with a special interest in account-
ing matters.  APTF has sought to influence the work of FASB through the busi-
ness representatives among the trustees of the FAF—FASB’s private principal.  
In theory, the bylaws of the FAF prohibit trustee interference in technical and 
agenda decisions of the standards-setters; in practice, however, such influence 
attempts do happen and tend to be successful.62  APTF may also air its views in 
meetings with the SEC or push its agenda on Capitol Hill in the hope that con-
certed political action may sway reluctant FASB members.63 
Finally, besides lobbying and threat strategies, business can seek to influ-
ence the making of standards via the normal due process, in particular through 
input in the public hearings or consultations that are part of the standardization 
process.64  In fact, the FASB relies on expert input for its operational viability in 
developing standards.  Large corporations have the necessary resources, includ-
ing technical expertise and organizational structure to be actively involved, and 
industry groups contribute an average of sixty to sixty-five percent of responses 
to FASB discussion memoranda and exposure drafts.  On certain projects more 
than eighty percent of the submissions at the consultation phase come from 
large firms and industry associations.  Their representation at public hearings is 
also in the sixty to seventy percent range.65 
Considering the special importance of the resources and expertise of the is-
suers of financial statements for the financial and operational viability of FASB, 
as well as the privileged access of business to FASB via FAF, it is not surprising 
that this group of stakeholders has been quite successful over the years in influ-
encing the procedures and substantive output of the standards-setter.  Industry 
groups have succeeded, for example, in having standards cancelled or restated.  
A case in point is an FASB accounting rule for the translation of foreign cur-
rency transactions and foreign currency financial statements, which came into 
effect in 1976.  Siding with the clearly stated preferences of investors and finan-
cial analysts, the new FASB standard required that exchange gains and losses 
resulting from translation be taken into income in the current period and not be 
deferred.  Monetary assets and liabilities such as cash, receivables, and payables 
would be translated at the foreign exchange rate in effect when balance sheets 
were prepared, and other assets and liabilities would be translated at the rate in 
 
 62. VAN RIPER, supra note 55, at 169; see also Wayne Baliga et al., News Report: Closer FAF In-
volvement Urged in FASB Standard-Setting, 167 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 18 (June 1989); Robert G. 
Walker and Peter Robinson, A Critical Assessment of the Literature on Political Activity and Account-
ing Regulation, 7 RESEARCH IN ACCT. REG. 3, 28, 37 n.5 (1993). 
 63. MILLER ET AL., supra note 46. 
 64. MILLER ET AL., supra note 46, at 67; Zeff, supra note 59, at 57, 60. 
 65. Timothy G. Sutton, Lobbying of Accounting Standard-Setting Bodies in the U.K. and the 
U.S.A.: A Downsian Analysis, 9 ACCT. ORG. AND SOC’Y 81, 85 (1984); STEPHEN MEZIAS & 
SEUNGWHA CHUNG, THE PROCESS AND PARTICIPATION AT FASB: A STUDY OF THE COMMENT 
PERIOD (1989), Clarence Sampson, The “Process” in Due Process: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at Stan-
dards Setting, FASB VIEWPOINT, at 4-6 (Oct. 14, 1991); Tandy & Wilburn, supra note 57, at 51; see also 
Walter & Robinson's excellent critique of this literature, supra note 62. 
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effect when the assets were acquired or the liabilities incurred.66  Firms with 
high levels of foreign market exposure strongly opposed this standard because it 
introduced what they considered excessive earnings volatility.  Large firms were 
united in their position on this issue, and smaller listed firms with no foreign ex-
change exposure were indifferent, allowing business opponents of the new stan-
dards to forge a unified “business” position on this issue.  Working through 
FAF and through lobbying groups, they put pressure on FASB to withdraw or 
change the standard until FASB announced in 1979 that it was working on a 
new standard that later replaced the 1976 rule. 
Business groups have been successful not only in shaping the content of ac-
counting rules; they also have left their imprint on the institutional structure 
and mode of operation of standard-setting in accounting.  Several examples are 
noteworthy:   
1) In response to business’s complaints that it was working on the wrong 
projects, and at the urging of FAF, FASB established the Emerging Issues Task 
Force (EITF) in 1984 to help it identify new trends and address new problems, 
providing firms greater influence on FASB’s agenda.   
2) Under pressure from business for more “pragmatism” and “practicality” 
on the part of FASB, the FAF trustees agreed in the 1990s to increase from one 
to two FASB members who are direct representatives from the corporate 
world.  Business also secured an additional place among the Foundation trus-
tees.   
3) Similarly, when a FASB member was up for re-election in 1990, business 
lobbied successfully to prevent his reappointment.67   
4) The original bylaws of the FAF explicitly prohibited interference with 
FASB technical or agenda decisions.  A 1991 revision, however, allowed the 
possibility that the trustees may “provide advice and counsel” to FASB on spe-
cific items.  The trustees exercised this provision, for example, in a 1992 meet-
ing, in response to fierce opposition by the Business Roundtable and other 
business organizations to FASB’s proposal for the expensing of stock options.  
In view of a unified position of the business community, the trustees urged 
members of FASB to drop their proposal—successfully.68   
 
 66. VAN RIPER, supra note 55, at 32. 
 67. The name of the Board member was Arthur Northrop.  Miller, Redding, and Bahnson sum up 
the episode as follows: “Northrop’s reappointment was not supported by the Financial Executives Insti-
tute because he had gravely disappointed leaders of the preparer constituency by not always taking po-
sitions on the issues that they expected, despite the fact that he had spent more than 40 years with IBM.  
This decision is significant because it shows that the trustees were again willing to use their appoint-
ment powers to try to shape the outcome of the Board’s process to meet their own needs.”  MILLER ET 
AL., supra note 46, at 183. 
 68. Ten years later, after the Enron debacle, FASB felt that the time was right for resuscitating its 
stock options project, resulting in the December 16, 2004 revision of the U.S. accounting standard for 
“Share-Based Payments” (Statement 123(R)), available at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr121604_ 
ebc.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2005), which requires the expensing of stock options.  This time, 
business was less unanimous in opposing the project.  Nevertheless, IT firms in particular have mounted 
a strong lobbying campaign against the project.  As a result, the House of Representatives passed in 
July 2004 the Stock Options Accounting Reform Act (H.R. 3574) that would override the standard-
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5) Finally, in the mid-1980s, a period of general deregulation, corporate 
America felt it was high time to curb what it viewed as rampant standard-
setting69 by changing the voting rule in FASB from simple majority back to su-
permajority to make it more difficult to adopt new standards.  The trustees 
complied and voted 11–5 to change the voting requirement.70 
Notwithstanding all these episodes in which business succeeded in getting its 
way at FASB, it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that accounting 
standards-setting simply boils down to business capture of a private-sector regu-
lator.  As argued in Part II.B, the delegation relationship is embedded in a 
broader political and economic context that affects and shapes this relationship.  
Changes in this macro-political context may change perceptions of the proper 
balance of interest representation and thus the urgency of weighing competing 
interests differentially in the process of rulemaking and improving the effec-
tiveness of mechanisms of administrative law in private governance.  This logic 
is illustrated in the following two sections, where we first describe the relation-
ship between FASB and its public principal, the SEC, then consider the effect 
of the macro-political context on this relationship. 
C. FASB and SEC 
As the public-sector principal of FASB, the SEC is charged with overseeing 
private-sector standards-setting activity.  Legally, it has the power to revoke 
FASB’s mandate or override its standards and replace them with its own rules.  
The SEC also monitors compliance with FASB standards and is responsible for 
their enforcement.  The close working relationship between the SEC (primarily 
 
setter by limiting options expensing to the five most highly paid executives.  The Senate referred the 
bill to the Committee on Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs, where it “died” when the committee did 
not take any action before the 108th Congress ended.  H.R. Res. 3574, 108th Cong. (2004).  However, 
upon heavy lobbying of the SEC by opponents of expensing, with support from a bipartisan group of 
members of Congress, FASB agreed to a six- to twelve-months delay before issuers of financial 
statements have to comply with the new standard.  The political battle over stock option expensing in 
the United States may therefore be expected to continue for most of 2005.  See Floyd Norris, Audit 
Board Delays Rule on Options As Expenses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, at C1; Gary Rivlin, Senators 
Lobby S.E.C. Chief to Delay New Options Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at C3; Gary Rivlin, 
Regulators Adopt Tighter Rules on Accounting for Stock Options, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at 
C5. 
 69. Not-for-attribution interviews with two former FASB officials, July 29, 2004 and August 3, 
2004. 
 70. The rule had been changed in 1977 from supermajority to simple majority.  See supra note 52.  
The supermajority requirement had been recommended by the 1972 Wheat Committee, which was the 
origin of the new institutional arrangement for accounting standard-setting, on grounds that it would 
reduce the likelihood of controversial rulings which may not enjoy wide support.  The change to simple 
majority in 1977 was justified in terms of speeding up the process of establishing standards and creating 
less scope for compromising on the substance of a standard.  See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
FOUNDATION, THE STRUCTURE OF ESTABLISHING FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 8 (Jan 26, 
1989); News Report: FASB “Supermajority” Voting Stirs Controversy, 169 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY at 13 
(April 1990); News Report: Supermajority Approved for New FASB Standards 170 J. OF 
ACCOUNTANCY at 18 (August 1990).  Revealingly, in the wake of the Enron scandal of 2001 the FAF 
decided to move back to simple majority, after FASB had come under heavy criticism for being slow to 
act and failing to adopt rules that would have tightened the criteria for keeping so-called special pur-
pose entities off corporate financial statements. 
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the Office of its Chief Accountant) and FASB has been described by a long-
time FASB staff member as follows: 
[A] close liaison was maintained between the two organizations . . . .  [T]heir staffs 
were in almost daily contact by telephone on a wide range of matters . . . .  [T]he 
[SEC] chief accountant participated in meetings of the Advisory Council . . . and 
[FASB] and the Commission held periodic joint meetings . . . to discuss matters of mu-
tual concern.  In addition, the respective chairmen met informally as circumstances 
required.71 
Operationally, however, FASB depends little on the SEC.  The FASB staff 
grew from a mere eight in 1973 to about eighty-five by the mid-1990s.  Over the 
same period—a period of greatly increased complexity of accounting matters—
the staff in the Office of the SEC’s Chief Accountant remained more or less 
steady, fluctuating around twenty-five.  The staff of FASB is thus more than 
three times as large as the staff of the SEC Chief Accountant’s Office, making 
any suggestion by the SEC that it might re-appropriate standards-setting (be-
yond the details of a particular measure) an empty threat.  At current levels of 
Congressional funding for the SEC, it has neither the expertise nor the capacity 
to take on standards-setting, as it is hardly able to fulfill its monitoring and en-
forcement mission.72 
Further, FASB pays private-sector salaries that are much higher than those 
offered to SEC staff.73  The considerably better pay has tended to attract more 
accounting talent to FASB than to the SEC.  As Miller, Redding, and Bahnson 
put it, 
Although working at the SEC may provide an intangible benefit from performing a 
public service, it seems unlikely that the [SEC] would be able to consistently locate, 
hire, train, and retain people whose talents and backgrounds are equal to those of the 
people at the FASB and who are also willing to make a long-term commitment.74 
The higher level of expertise at FASB should objectively improve the tech-
nical quality of the standards and the efficiency of standards-setting, as argued 
in Part II.  Yet, it also has the effect that SEC employees at the highest level on 
occasion encounter their superiors from former private-sector jobs as the FASB 
members or FASB senior staff whose work they are now supposed to oversee.75 
Arguably the most important role performed by the SEC staff is to feed 
back to FASB systematic data on enforcement problems with existing account-
ing standards or to report difficulties that SEC registrants may experience in 
implementing specific FASB rules.76  Such information assists the agent in revis-
 
 71. VAN RIPER, supra note 55, at 144.  Van Riper worked for the FASB from 1973 to 1991. 
 72. Interviews with current and former SEC staff. 
 73. For example, in 1997, the SEC chief accountant earned $123,000 while Board members or 
FASB’s director of research and technical activities earned $345,000.  The salaries of the SEC Chief 
Accountant’s professional staff ranged from $47,180 to $99,250, whereas FASB project managers 
earned between $80,000 and $125,000.  MILLER ET AL., supra note 46, at 158. 
 74. MILLER ET AL., supra note 46, at 158. 
 75. Interviews at SEC and FASB. 
 76. FASB staff may of course also learn of enforcement and implementation problems directly 
from interactions with its constituents. 
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ing and improving its standards.  The SEC, however, rarely tells FASB what 
items to work on.  For the most part, the flow of information is from FASB to 
the SEC.  FASB keeps the SEC informed of new projects, but it depends on the 
SEC for neither guidance nor expertise.  Whereas the early and untested FASB 
still had to fight turf battles with the SEC, it has over time established itself 
quite unambiguously as the focal U.S. institution for rulemaking in accounting.77 
D. FASB, SEC, and the Accounting Standards Stakeholders in the Macro-
Political Context 
This account of the relationship between FASB and the SEC would be in-
complete, however, without considering the role of exogenous analytical fac-
tors, chiefly the macro-political context.  Three main groups have a stake in ac-
counting standards: the business firms that prepare and issue financial 
statements, the users of such statements (mostly investors), and the account-
ants.  All three groups operate within a broader macro-political context, which 
affects their relative power.  The weight given to the concerns of the first group 
of stakeholders (that is, business) vis-à-vis the concerns of the second group 
(that is, investors), for instance, is partly a function of more general politically 
salient attitudes toward regulation. 
The SEC as a politicized regulatory agent is bound to be attentive to this 
broader political context.  The President appoints the five Commissioners (sub-
ject to Senate confirmation and the restriction that no more than three of them 
be of the same political party).  At least three of the Commissioners therefore 
tend to share the policy views of the current administration (though they may 
differ on specifics), and Congress oversees the SEC, holding it accountable as it 
sees fit.78  The SEC’s approach to regulatory matters, including accounting stan-
dards-setting, is therefore very much a function of the mood of a period re-
flected in specific political and economic realities.  As a result, SEC demands 
and expectations of FASB are likely to vary over time.  The election of Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan, for instance, institutionalized a change in the macro-
political climate in favor of deregulation and economic laissez-faire.  Among 
Reagan’s first appointments was a new SEC chairman, John Shad, who had a 
far less activist attitude than his predecessor Harold Williams.  Shad, in turn, 
filled the chief accountant’s position with Clarence Sampson, who largely left 
FASB to its own devices.79  Unsurprisingly, it was especially during the Reagan 
and Bush (Sr.) presidencies that business solidified its control over FASB.  Such 
influence is not undisputed:  Dennis Beresford, FASB chairman from 1987 until 
 
 77. WALTER SCHUETZE, REFLECTIONS OF A FORMER MEMBER OF THE FASB 7 (1978). 
 78. See, e.g., ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION 35 (1992); 
THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. 
REGULATORY AGENCIES 2679 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1973); BARRY WEINGAST, The Congressional-
Bureaucratic System:  A Principal Agent Perspective (with Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 
147, 160 (1984). 
 79. MILLER ET AL., supra note 46, at 102. 
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1997, steadfastly denied that the corporate community had gained influence 
over FASB’s deliberations on technical issues.  An FASB insider, however, 
commented in 1994: 
In a literal sense, in terms of the Board’s painstaking consideration of the details of 
any given issue, [Beresford] is right.  But in terms of the overall balance of power in 
the standard-setting structure, the atmosphere in which the standard setters work, and 
the trend lines and fault lines that are developing, he is overlooking some stark reali-
ties.80 
Occasionally, individual members of Congress have criticized what they per-
ceived as excessive business influence in private rulemaking.  Representative 
John Dingell (D-MI), for example, former chairman of both the House Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce and its Subcommittee on Oversight and In-
vestigations, wrote in the mid-1980s to the SEC chairman, advising him of the 
subcommittee’s expectation that the SEC use its power to shield FASB from 
what he called “improper influence” by the business community.  A few years 
later, during the (first) battle over how to account for stock options, the chair-
man of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, Repre-
sentative Edward Markey (D-MA), deplored business’s “ferocious hardball tac-
tics and not-so-subtle threats” to FASB and went on to note: 
The federal government allows the accounting profession to establish its own rules 
and standards, with limited federal oversight, because it has been promised that the 
profession can do so objectively and responsibly. . .  The . . . reported threats raise se-
rious doubts about the wisdom of delegating such broad and important responsibilities 
to the accounting profession in the first place.81 
More generally, Dingell, Markey, and a few others felt that the interests of 
users of financial information (investors, creditors, and others) were being over-
looked.  Such users typically want a maximum of detailed, reliable, and relevant 
information.  From their perspective, standards should achieve maximum dis-
closure of firms’ assets and liabilities and present them in a consistent, easily ac-
cessible format.  Users also favor a transparent and broadly inclusive process of 
standardization.  Investors and other users, however, are disadvantaged vis-à-
vis reporting business firms not only because they have fewer resources and 
tend to be less well organized as a group, but also because the delegation to a 
private agent puts them in a less favorable position to influence the process of 
standardization. 
Accountants responsible for auditing the books of firms are the third main 
group with a stake in standardization.  Generally, they are inclined to want 
more, and more specific, standards, which will defuse differences of opinion 
with clients.  At the same time, however, accountants depend on firms for audit 
engagements and, until recently, increasingly also for various forms of consult-
 
 80. VAN RIPER, supra note 55, at 170 (emphasis added); see also Dale Gerboth, Research, Intui-
tion, and Politics in Accounting Inquiry, 48 ACCT. REV. 475 (1973). 
 81. Press Release, Office of Representative Edward Markey (Apr. 7, 1993) as quoted in VAN 
RIPER, supra note 55, at 155. 
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ing work.82  Though they pride themselves on their analytical abilities and pro-
fessional objectivity, accountants may be tempted to take a less stringent and 
more compromising approach, especially in a highly competitive environment.  
And there is little doubt that the environment for consulting became markedly 
more competitive in the second half of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, 
making auditors much more pliant to the wishes and demands of business 
firms.83 
For all these reasons, politicians such as Dingell and Markey have at times 
demanded that standardization be taken over by the SEC or by a congression-
ally mandated “self-regulatory organization” under the control of the SEC, for 
example, along the lines of the municipal Securities Rule-making Board, whose 
rules covering municipal bond trading are subject to formal approval by the 
SEC and official review by the three federal bank regulatory agencies prior to 
becoming effective. 
These demands, however, fell on deaf ears in a macro-political climate of 
deregulation and unbridled faith in market forces—until a series of major cor-
porate accounting scandals, coupled with a marked cooling of the economy, 
dramatically changed the macro-political climate, invigorating the SEC to take 
on a more activist role.84  Scholars and journalists writing about the politics of 
regulation often speak of this latest pro-regulatory political climate for financial 
markets as the “post-Enron” mood, in which tighter regulation is seen as neces-
sary even by principled free-market advocates “to rebuild confidence after 
egregious scandals.”85  The name of the former energy conglomerate has par-
ticular symbolic relevance for accounting standards-setting since its collapse was 
attributed in part to ambiguities and loopholes in accounting standards, which 
made many of Enron’s accounting practices questionable but arguably not ille-
gal.86  In a speech notable for its directness and forceful tone, SEC Chief Ac-
countant Robert Herdman noted in 2002, 
 
 82. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act restricted the kinds and amounts of non-audit work that can be done 
by the accountants who work as auditors for a given firm.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 210 and Regulation S-
X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2002), as updated by SEC Release No. 33-8183 (May 6, 2003); (current version 
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/regsx.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005)). 
 83. MARK STEVENS, THE ACCOUNTING WARS (1985); MARK STEVENS, THE BIG EIGHT (1981); 
MARK STEVENS & CAROL BLOOM STEVENS, THE BIG SIX: THE SELLING OUT OF AMERICA’S TOP 
ACCOUNTING FIRMS (1991). 
 84. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST 
PROSPEROUS DECADE 115, 241 (2003). 
 85. John Plender, Too Many Watchdogs Barking, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2005, at 16. 
 86. This assessment was not limited to the Enron Board’s investigative report by William C. 
Powers et al (REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (2002) available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ 
enron/sicreport/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2005)).   The Special Investigative Committee acknowledged false 
accounting (POWERS ET AL., at 58, 198f), but blamed FASB standards for “little guidance” and “no 
clear answers” on how to treat special purpose entities in the company’s financial statements (Id. at 37, 
180).  The assessment was shared by later, outside observers.  E.g., HOWARD SCHILIT, As Bad as It 
Gets, FINANCIAL SHENANIGANS: HOW TO DETECT ACCOUNTING GIMMICKS & FRAUD IN FINANCIAL 
REPORTS 259 (2nd ed. 2002); Ian P. Dewing & Peter O. Russell, Accounting, Auditing and Corporate 
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[E]ven before Enron’s collapse, we called upon the FASB to work with us to address 
concerns about timeliness, transparency, and complexity. . . .  Going forward, we plan 
to make some changes to the historical way in which we have delegated our authority to 
oversee the standard-setting process. . . .  We plan to 1) broaden funding sources and 
make the funding involuntary, 2) meaningfully participate in selecting the members of 
FASB and setting the FASB agenda, 3) exercise our authority to review standards ac-
tually adopted, and 4) ensure that the FASB promulgates principle-based standards, 
which adapt faster to changing business environment and emphasize overall accuracy 
and completeness.87 
The SEC’s first new objective has been attained.  Under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, FASB now receives mandated funding from public companies.88  Com-
menting on the funding change, Robert Herz, FASB chairman since 2002, 
spoke words that in the pre-Enron era would have struck many within the pri-
vate-sector standards community as pure heresy: 
[W]e need the support, understanding, and partnership of politicians and government 
officials in helping [to] ensure that accounting standard setting is not subject to inap-
propriate constituent influence.  And indeed, I believe that a clear aim of Sarbanes-
Oxley in trying to bolster the financial security of the FASB through the mandated 
funding was to help ensure that our standard setting is carried out in an independent, 
objective, and neutral way.  That’s a tough one for some people to understand and 
even tougher for some to accept.89 
Progress on Herdman’s other objectives is less certain.  In particular, it is 
unlikely that much will change in the scope and intensity of SEC oversight, 
given the continuing asymmetry of resources and staff between FASB and the 
Office of the SEC Chief Accountant.  While the staff of the latter has increased 
since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, so have the tasks the Office is 
asked to tackle.  They include not only keeping an eye on private-sector stan-
dards-setting, but also working to improve the implementation, auditing, and 
enforcement of accounting standards. 
Nonetheless, the change in the macro-political climate post-Enron has trig-
gered a series of notable additional institutional changes at FASB, aimed at im-
proving its due process.  All of these changes may be seen as adopting or im-
proving administrative law procedures.  In the summer of 2002, for example, 
FASB sent letters to chief executive officers of mutual funds, investment and 
commercial banks, rating agencies, and other user groups, inviting them to join 
 
Governance of European Listed Countries: EU Policy Developments Before and After Enron, 42 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 289, 301 (2004). 
 87. Robert Herdman, Address delivered at the Schmalenbach Institute for Business Administra-
tion, Cologne, Germany, (Apr. 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch554.htm (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2005) (emphasis added).  Herdman reiterated the main points in congressional testi-
mony.  Are Current Financial Accounting Standards Protecting Investors?  Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
107th Cong. 2nd Session (2002) (testimony of Robert Herdman), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/021402tsrkh.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
 88. A similar arrangement exists in Britain, where the Financial Reporting Council, responsible for 
setting and enforcing accounting rules, draws its corporate funding from a levy applied by the Financial 
Services Authority, the main financial regulator. 
 89. Robert Herz, Address to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, (Dec. 12, 
2003) (on file with authors). 
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the newly-created User Advisory Council (UAC).  The UAC, whose purpose is 
to offer user groups a direct channel of communication with the Board, has now 
about forty members.  It meets twice a year with the Board.  Another outreach 
initiative is the creation in 2004 of the Small Business Advisory Committee 
(SBAC).  Participation of small business firms has traditionally been rare, either 
because of the costs of having an employee monitor FASB activities, attend 
hearings, etc., or because of weak organizational support structures and collec-
tive action problems plaguing small firms.  The SBAC, which meets twice yearly 
with FASB, is meant to overcome some of these difficulties and give small busi-
ness a voice in the process of rulemaking in accounting.  Finally, it also is nota-
ble that the FASB has agreed to return to the majority decision rule to improve 
the speed with which accounting standards are adopted.  Further institutional 
changes, however, appear unlikely, not least because the anti-regulatory 
counter-trend against the 2001-2002 change in macro-political climate is by now 
well underway.90 
IV 
IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL PRIVATE GOVERNANCE IN ACCOUNTING 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has been in exis-
tence for four years now—too short a period for systematic study.  It is never-
theless worthwhile to examine the implications of the preceding analysis for the 
international experiment in private rulemaking in accounting.  To do so, we first 
clarify the identity of both agent and principals at the global level, analyze how 
and to what extent differences in P-A relationships between the United States 
and the international cases are likely to affect the conclusions reached in the 
preceding section. 
A. An International Private-Sector Institution for Setting Standards in Ac-
counting 
The international institutional structure for setting accounting standards 
closely follows the structure of the American model.  It comprises four major 
bodies:  the trustees, the IASB, the Standards Advisory Council (SAC), and the 
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC).91 
 
 90. See, inter alia, the Jan. 21, 2005, report on the increasing corporate pushback against post-
Enron accounting and corporate governance regulation, at http://marketplace.publicradio.org/shows/ 
2005/01/21/PM200501211.html; and the publications discussed in Samuel Brittan, The Rising Spectre of 
Intrusive Regulation, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at 13. 
 91. See http://www.iasb.org; see also KRISTINA TAMM HALLSTRÖM, ORGANIZING 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION (2004); HENNIE VAN GREUNING & MARIUS KOEN, 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (rev. 2004).  On inter-
national accounting standards see BARRY EPSTEIN & ABBAS ALI MIRZA, IFRS 2005: 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL 
REPORTING STANDARDS (2005); CLARE ROBERTS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH (2005). 
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Ensuring the viability and providing general oversight of the international 
private accounting-standards-setter is the responsibility of the nineteen trustees 
of the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation (IASC).92  
They appoint the members of the IASB, SAC, and IFRIC.  They also monitor 
the IASB’s effectiveness, raise funds for it, approve its budget and have respon-
sibility for constitutional changes.  The International Federation of Accountants 
nominates candidates to fill five of the nineteen trustee seats; international or-
ganizations of preparers, users, and academics may each select one representa-
tive.93  The remaining eleven trustees are “at-large,” that is, they are not se-
lected through a constituency nominating process but are chosen based on 
recommendations of individual trustees. 
IASB has fourteen members (twelve full-time and two part-time members), 
appointed by the IASC Foundation trustees.  The Board has sole responsibility 
for setting accounting standards. At least five Board members must have a 
background as practicing auditors, three as preparers of financial statements, 
and another three as users of financial statements.  One Board member hails 
from academia.  Seven of the full-time members have formal liaison responsi-
bilities with national standard-setters in order to promote the convergence be-
tween national and international accounting standards (though they must not 
be voting members of the national standard-setting bodies).94  Each IASB 
member has one vote, and a simple majority of eight votes is required for the 
adoption of a standard.95 
The Standards Advisory Council is formally charged with commenting on 
IASB projects and giving advice to both trustees and Board members.  The 
SAC is geographically diverse and has about fifty members, predominantly 
from industry and the accountancy profession.  Its members are appointed by 
the trustees for a renewable term of three years.  The SAC meets three times a 
year. 
The IFRIC, finally, is responsible for reviewing accounting issues that are 
likely to receive divergent treatment in the absence of authoritative guidance.  
It has twelve voting members and a non-voting chairman.  IFRIC interpreta-
tions are valid only if approved by IASB. 
The process of developing standards typically occurs in four steps.  First, 
during the early stage of a standard project, IASB may establish an advisory 
committee headed by a Board member, to advise on the issues arising in the 
project.  The SAC may also be invited to offer comments.  Second, on major 
 
 92. The foundation is a not-for-profit corporation registered in Delaware. 
 93. These organizations include the International Association of Financial Executives Institutes, 
the International Council of Investment Association, and the International Association for Accounting 
Education and Research. 
 94. The national standard-setters are FASB, the British Accounting Standards Board (ASB), the 
Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB), the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB), 
the French Conseil Nationale de la Comptabilité (CNC), the German Accounting Standards Commit-
tee (DRSC), and the Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ). 
 95. IASB is currently undergoing a review of its governance structure. 
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projects, IASB publishes an initial discussion paper for public comment.  Third, 
upon reviewing the comments, IASB issues an “exposure draft” for public 
comment.  Fourth, after considering the comments, IASB publishes the final 
standard. 
In sum, the key institution of the new international accounting standards-
setting system is IASB; it is the agent in charge of setting the international stan-
dards known as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs; its 
predecessor, the old IASC, produced the International Accounting Standards 
(IASs)).  Its private-sector principal is the board of trustees of the IASC Foun-
dation whose membership comprises mostly representatives from the account-
ing profession and industry. 
B. Endorsement by Public-Sector Principals 
Who are the public-sector principals of IASB?  Unlike in the United States, 
where the SEC is the sole public-sector principal of the private standards-setter 
(and has conferred public regulatory authority on FASB), no single interna-
tional governmental or trans-governmental organization possesses exclusive ju-
risdiction in accounting.  Instead, several major international organizations 
claim interest and authority in the area of financial reporting; and over the past 
ten years, many of these public principals have come to endorse IASB (and its 
predecessor, the IASC), thereby committing themselves to accept international 
accounting standards as authoritative rules. 
Maybe most importantly, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO)—the trans-governmental organization of financial mar-
ket supervisory institutions from 105 countries, regulating ninety percent of the 
world’s financial securities markets—reached an agreement with the IASC in 
1995, committing stock market regulators to endorse a set of “core standards” 
when completed in 1999.96  In 2000, IOSCO endorsed thirty extant international 
accounting standards and generally recommended the use of IASs for cross-
border offerings and listings.97 
Similarly, the WTO stated at the conclusion of the Singapore Ministerial 
Meeting of 1996 that “[w]e encourage the successful completion of international 
accounting standards . . . by the International Federation of Accountancy 
(IFAC) . . . [and] the International Accounting Standards Committee.”98  Joel 
Trachtman has argued that this statement signals the WTO’s deference and in 
 
 96. See http://www.iosco.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).  Under the agreement, IOSCO was al-
lowed to monitor the IASC standard-setting process as a non-voting observer at both steering commit-
tee and Board meetings. 
 97. Press Release, IOSCO, IOSCO Announces Completion of Its Assessment of the Accounting 
Standards Issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) (May 2000) at 
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS26.pdf (on file with authors).  Agreement on matters of 
international standards in IOSCO is far from guaranteed.  See David A. Singer, Capital Rules: The 
Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization, 58 INT’L ORG. 531, 546 (2004). 
 98. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO, § 17 (1996).  The IFAC develops auditing standards 
only. 
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effect delegation (at least in part and in political terms, as opposed to legal 
terms) to these non-governmental organizations. 
The WTO thus has  . . . ‘delegated’ to specific functional organizations the task of es-
tablishing standards to facilitate the free movement of accountancy services.  This par-
ticular delegation is not inconsistent with prior practice in other areas, such as food 
safety standards (Codex Alimentarius Commission) and general product standards 
(ISO).  We begin to see some evidence of a common institutional solution to [trade 
problems] utilizing informational ‘delegation’ to specialized functional organizations.  
The further question, however, is how will the WTO [and its member states] ensure 
that these organizations reflect appropriately the trade perspective that concern the 
WTO?  This is an agency problem . . .  [H]ow can the WTO ensure that [these func-
tional organizations] are faithful and diligent agents?99 
In 1998, the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors issued a 
declaration similarly endorsing the work of the IASC and calling on it to “final-
ize by early 1999 a proposal for a full range of internationally agreed accounting 
standards.”100  This and other statements by institutions such as the World Bank, 
the IMF, and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS),101 as well 
as endorsing legislation by powerful groups such as the European Union,102 have 
provided the IASC (now IASB) with an implicit but nevertheless firm mandate 
to produce global financial reporting rules.  As a result, not only has the pace of 
standards production increased rapidly, but the number of countries with stock 
listing requirements or national securities legislation permitting foreign compa-
nies to prepare their consolidated financial statements using these standards has 
also grown steadily. 
C. Principal–Agent Relationships in the International Context 
Faced on the one hand with multiple public-sector principals, and on the 
other with a private-sector principal (the trustees of the IASC Foundation), to 
whom will the IASB listen most closely?  Our theoretical model predicts—and 
our analysis of accounting standards-setting in the United States shows—that 
 
 99. Joel Trachtman, A Sectoral Analysis of Disciplines on Domestic Regulation and International 
Standard-Setting in Financial Services (2002), Mimeo.  See also World Trade Organization Supports 
IASC Standards, MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING: MAGAZINE FOR CHARTERED MANAGEMENT 
ACCOUNTANTS, at 3 (Feb. 2, 1997). 
 100. Declaration of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, G-7 (Oct. 30, 1998); see also 
Final Report to the G-7 Heads of State and Government on Promoting Financial Stability, G-7, (June 21, 
1997); Strengthening the Architecture of the Global Financial System: Report of the G-7 Finance Minis-
ters to G-7 Heads of State or Government for Their Meeting in Birmingham, May 1998, G-7 (May 15, 
1998). 
 101. See THE WORLD BANK, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING, REPORTING AND AUDITING HANDBOOK 
(1995); Report of the Management Director to the Interim Committee on Progress in Strengthening the 
Architecture of the International Financial System, IMF (Apr. 26, 1999); James Wolfensohn, Address to 
the World Congress of Accountants, Paris, France (Oct. 26, 1997); Report to G-7 Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors on International Accounting Standards, Basle Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (Apr. 2000); Issues Paper of the Task Force on Implementation of Standards, Financial Stability 
Forum (Mar. 25-26, 2000).  The World Bank now includes the use of IASs/IFRSs as a condition of its 
loan agreements. 
 102. The EU has adopted regulations requiring listed companies to prepare consolidated accounts 
in accordance with IASs starting in 2005.  See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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the agent’s behavior will diverge from the principals’ preferences as a function 
of the relative tightness of each of the P-A relationships.  Specifically, the influ-
ence of each principal will depend on its relative importance for the agent’s fi-
nancial and operational viability as well as on the agent’s effectiveness in rule-
making, given the macro-political context.  How does this hypothesis translate 
in the international context? 
Funding for IASB comes largely from voluntary business contributions, 
which is similar to the situation in the United States prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002. IASB reported receiving in 2001 about $11 million from 125 com-
panies, $5 million from the ‘Big Five’ accounting firms, and between $1 million 
and $2 million from central banks and bodies such as development banks.  In 
theory, IASB’s independence is ensured by its separation from the fundraising.  
The FASB case suggests, however, that such separation fails to shield standard-
setters in practice from considerable business pressure.  Indeed, the chairman of 
IASB, David Tweedie, complained only one year after it was launched that cer-
tain powerful donors were threatening to withdraw their financial support and 
“perhaps [even] destroy the organization” if IASB failed to show greater sensi-
tivity to their policy preferences.103  It thus appears that powerful firms will seek 
to trade cash for favors as long as IASB funding is voluntary.  This may come at 
the expense of the interests of investors and other stakeholders who favor de-
tailed and transparent financial reporting.  The U.S. case suggests that alterna-
tive sources of funding are required to guarantee effective independence.  One 
possible arrangement would be for securities regulators in countries subscribing 
to IASB rules to add a levy to their listing fees; another is for IASB to be 
funded via contributions from central banks, financial services regulators, and 
governments.  The latter option creates the risk, however, of exposing IASB to 
political pressure. 
The viability of IASB, like that of FASB, is not simply a function of finan-
cial resources; it also involves operational viability for which the agent needs to 
rely on specialized expertise.  As in the United States, technical expertise at the 
international level resides primarily in the private sector.  Consequently, pre-
parers and large multinational accounting firms are the largest and most influ-
ential groups in the international standards-setting process, thanks to their abil-
ity to provide substantive input, both formally and informally.  Large firms 
acting individually and business associations are also the most active lobbyists 
once an item is on the international standard-setting agenda, notably by submit-
ting the bulk of comment letters in response to draft IASs.104 
 
 103. Andrew Hill & Andrew Parker, Standard-Setters Are Targeting Stock Options Again, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at 21. 
 104. Sara York Kenny and Robert L. Larson, The Development of International Accounting Stan-
dards:  An Analysis of Constituent Participation in Standard-Setting, 30 INT’L J. OF ACCT. 283 (1995);  
Robert K. Larson, Corporate Lobbying in the International Accounting Standards Committee, 8 J. 
INT’L FIN. MGMT. & ACCT. 175 (Autumn 1997). 
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In contrast to the domestic level, however, international accounting exper-
tise is unevenly distributed geographically, which introduces a new dimension 
into the analysis: a regional-cultural bias.  At the global level, it is the Ameri-
cans and British who arguably have the most extensive experience writing rules 
for national capital markets—the world’s largest such markets.105  Indeed, the 
U.S. capital market alone accounts for half of the world’s capitalization.  Un-
surprisingly, accounting expertise for writing standards for corporate financial 
statements is heavily concentrated in the Anglo-Saxon world.106 
This striking regional asymmetry in expertise and resources is, in part, the 
consequence of fundamental differences between the Anglo-Saxon model of 
accounting and the continental European tradition.  They reflect differences in 
the legal system, the relative importance of capital markets, and the role of gov-
ernment in capital and other markets.  In the United States and United King-
dom, where stock markets have long been the main source of capital for firms, 
the needs of investors have been a main consideration in the development of 
accounting standards.  The elaboration of standards has been delegated by pub-
lic regulators to the private sector, specifically, the accountancy profession.  In 
most continental European countries, the main purpose of statements of ac-
counts has been tax assessment and the protection of creditors.  The basis of ac-
counting thus tends to be highly legalistic.  Private shareholding has long been 
much less widespread than in the Anglo-Saxon world; individual investors tradi-
tionally have preferred bonds to equity.  The key providers of capital have tra-
ditionally been banks.  These financial institutions are often represented on the 
boards of companies in which they are significant investors.  As such they are 
assumed to be privy to inside information; legal disclosure requirements are 
therefore of less importance to them than to American or British holders of fi-
nancial securities.107 
In short, in the continental European tradition the dominant concern is 
taxation and the protection of credit institutions, not the provision of informa-
tion for investors. Accounting principles are enshrined in tax laws that are the 
products of democratic political processes; by contrast, in the Anglo-Saxon 
 
 105. See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital 
Market Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589,  592 (2001). 
 106. The concentration is partly due to the history of the accountancy profession, which in the 
United Kingdom dates back to 1854 (when the Society of Accountants was founded) and in the United 
States to 1887 (when the American Institute of Accountants was established), whereas for instance the 
German profession dates only from 1932, and the French from 1942.  According to Stewart Hamilton, 
the United States counted in the early 1990s over 260,000 certified public accountants and the UK some 
100,000 chartered members of accountancy bodies (Stewart Hamilton, Accountants Gather Round Dif-
ferent Standards, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1998, at 12).  The corresponding figures for France and Ger-
many, according to Hamilton, were 11,000 and 5,000 respectively—though these figures seem to exag-
gerate the skew of the distribution of accounting expertise by not considering that the various functions 
of accountants in the United States are fulfilled by several different professions in some other countries 
(such as Wirtschaftsprüfer, Steuerberater, and tax lawyers in the German context).  There is no doubt, 
however, that the distribution of financial reporting standards expertise is skewed. 
 107. CHRISTOPHER NOBES & ROBERT PARKER, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
15 (5th ed. 1998). 
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model, accounting rules result from private-sector processes funded by indus-
try.108 
The contest between these two models (which incidentally is also a contest 
for international relevance and salience of the technical expertise that supports 
the competing models) seems to have been decided in favor of market-oriented 
reporting.  This is in no small part due to major European corporations, who, in 
order to tap into the vast U.S. capital market, have accepted listing require-
ments of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), most notably compliance with 
the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) produced by 
FASB.  The motivation for cross-border listings is straightforward:  such listings 
broaden a firm’s financial options, often allowing it to raise more capital and on 
better terms than in the home market; they also broaden the shareholder base, 
spreading financial risk for firms; last but not least, they add an element of pres-
tige and recognition to a firm’s name.109  The first major European corporation 
to embrace U.S. accounting rules and list on the NYSE was Daimler-Benz in 
1993.  When it broke ranks, many Europeans regarded the move as treachery.110  
The lure of the U.S. capital market, however, seemed irresistible, and soon 
other major European firms jumped on the U.S. GAAP bandwagon, including 
Nestlé, Unilever, VEBA, Hoechst, Rhone-Poulenc, Olivetti, Peugeot, Citröen, 
and Volkswagen.111 
Given the dominance and attraction of the American and British capital 
markets for global business, it is not surprising that Anglo-Saxon experts are 
central in shaping international accounting rules.  One measure of Anglo-Saxon 
influence can be gleaned from the composition of the IASB in 2001.112  Five of 
 
 108. Inevitably, differences in philosophies and general principles underlying accounting standards 
lead to fundamental substantive differences in the treatment of many economic activities (such as 
mergers, pensions, leases, and changes in the value of financial instruments).  Consider the following 
example: Income taxes in Germany are based primarily on externally reported accounting profit, so 
there are strong legal and economic pressures to report income and asset values conservatively.  Con-
sequently, German accounting standards allow management considerable flexibility in determining the 
appropriate allowance for all possible losses.  Specifically, transfers to and from reserves need not even 
be disclosed.  Thus if a firm wants to report an increase in income it can charge some expenses against 
reserves instead of against income without having to disclose such charges in the financial statements.  
Such practices are expressly prohibited in the United States and United Kingdom where reserves can 
be set aside for identifiable probable losses but where transfers to and from reserves must be disclosed 
in the financial statements. 
 109. Leonardo Martinez, Private Expertise and Global Economic Governance: The Case of Interna-
tional Accounting Standards, 54-56 (2001) (unpublished M.Phil thesis, Oxford University). 
 110. Lee H. Radebaugh et al., Foreign Exchange Listings: A Case Study of Daimler-Benz, 6 J. INT’L 
FIN. MGMT ACCT. 158 (1995).  Not only were other German and European business leaders incensed 
by Daimler-Benz’s willingness to adopt U.S. GAAP, they were also troubled by its acceptance of the 
requirement to publish quarterly results; few Germans understood the American fixation on earnings 
per share as a performance measure. 
 111. In 1990, foreign companies raised $8 billion in the United States; by 1998 the number had shot 
up to $170 billion.  Franck Bancel & Usha Mittoo, European Managerial Perceptions of the Net Benefits 
of Foreign Stock Listings, 7 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 213 (2001). 
 112. The nationality of IASB members should matter, given the difference in approaches to ac-
counting as well as the empirical finding that substantive accounting standards preferences tend to be 
very similar among firms from the same countries but differ among firms from different countries, with 
firms from Anglo-Saxon countries often showing similar preference; see Robert K. Larson and Karen 
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the fourteen Board members were U.S. citizens.  The United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, South Africa, and Australia together accounted for no fewer 
than ten members.113  Considering that under IASB rules the adoption of a stan-
dard requires approval by eight of the Board’s fourteen members, Anglo-Saxon 
influence is guaranteed. 
Finally, while ensuring operational viability may be the agent’s first concern, 
effectiveness as a regulator also needs to be a centrally important concern for 
the agent, that is, the regulator’s ability to gain acceptance for and compliance 
with its standards.  Attaining this objective does not seem to have been overly 
difficult for IASB—despite its strong regional bias.  IASB regulatory effective-
ness has been boosted by an overriding preference of global firms for a single 
set of accounting rules.  The European case is particularly instructive:  In adopt-
ing Regulation 1606/2002, which requires European firms to prepare consoli-
dated accounts in accordance with international accounting standards, the EU 
reserved the right to review all IASB standards and to correct any perceived 
material deficiencies or concerns regarding IASs or IFRSs.114  This was pre-
sented as retaining the authority to exercise necessary regulatory oversight, 
seen as needed due to the perceived Anglo-Saxon bias of IASB.115  It is ques-
tionable, however, whether such conditionality can be effective.  In theory, it 
seems to be a reasonable way of ensuring that any new standard passes a mini-
mum legitimacy threshold.  In practice, though, it may well turn out to be an in-
effective policy, because European multinationals have a strong preference for 
common global standards and are therefore likely to oppose any review deci-
sion that ”Europeanizes” IASs, resulting in two sets of rules. 
 
L. Brown, Lobbying of the International Accounting Standards Committee:  The Case of Construction 
Contracts, 14 ADVANCES IN INT’L ACCT. 62 (2001). 
 113. David Tweedie, former head of the British Accounting Standards Board was appointed as 
chairman when IASB was formed in 2001; the vice chairman of the new Board was Thomas Jones, a 
British national who formerly had been chief financial officer of Citicorp.  The Board included two ac-
countants with long-time experience at FASB: Anthony Cope and James Leisenring (a former FASB 
vice chairman, who was the official liaison Board member to FASB).  The other liaison members to 
their respective national organizations were Tricia O’Malley, former chairwoman of the Canadian Ac-
counting Standards Board and KPMG partner; Hans-Georg Bruns of Germany, an official of Daimler 
Chrysler; Gilbert Gélard, a French partner of KPMG and former IASC Board member; Warren 
McGregor, a former chief executive of the Australian Standards Board (also liaison to New Zealand); 
Geoffrey Whittington, an accounting professor at Cambridge University; and Tatsumi Yamada, a part-
ner at the Japanese affiliate of Price Waterhouse Coopers.  The remaining full-time Board members 
were Robert Garnett, a South African and an executive of the minerals giant Anglo American, and 
Harry Schmid, a Swiss executive of Nestle.  The two part-time members were Mary Barth, a Stanford 
University professor and former partner of Arthur Andersen, and Robert Herz, a partner at Price 
Waterhouse Cooper in New York.  Some of these individuals have in the meantime been replaced, but 
the Anglo-Saxon group remains dominant. Anglo-Saxon dominance also has a long tradition in IASB's 
predecessor, the IASC, where even the few participating developing countries were almost all former 
British colonies or protectorates.  See Kenny and Larson, supra note 104; Robert K. Larson and Sara 
York Kenny, Research Note: Developing Countries' Involvement in the IASC's Standard-Setting Proc-
ess, 11 sup. 1 ADVANCES IN INT’L ACCT. 17 (1998). 
 114. Council Regulation 1606/2002, art. 3, 2002 O.J. (L 243). 
 115. For this purpose the Commission promoted the creation of a review body named the European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group, incorporating expert users, accountancy professionals, and regu-
lators. 
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Consequently, IASB seems unlikely to change a standard to accommodate 
European preference or governance needs, as EU threats to review and “Euro-
peanize” a particular IAS or IFRS is credible only if large segments of corpo-
rate Europe oppose the draft of that particular international standard or if 
IASB is fundamentally at odds with the macro-political climate.  This seems to 
have been the case recently in the row over rules regarding the financial report-
ing of derivatives and other financial instruments.  Two IASB proposals (known 
as IAS 32 and IAS 39) require companies to report on derivatives and certain 
other instruments at market values rather than historic costs and to place re-
strictions on the use of these instruments in hedge accounting.  Many European 
banks and insurance companies oppose such proposals, arguing that the new 
rules would inject heavy volatility into profits and balance sheets.  The final 
outcome is uncertain.116 
The macro-political context also affects IASB more broadly and has re-
cently led it to consider instituting administrative law procedures.  Some critics 
oppose IASB standards not only on substantive but also on procedural grounds.  
They argue that the IASB due process is faulty and insist that IASB improve it 
by making deliberations more transparent and getting more input from compa-
nies and investors.  These demands have become much more salient and press-
ing since Enron and a series of other corporate scandals that have ushered in a 
new macro-political climate affecting private rulemaking in accounting.117 
Similarly to FASB post-Enron, IASB has been bowing to this mounting 
pressure for institutional change and has agreed to strengthen some of its pro-
cedures to comply more fully with basic principles of administrative law.  For 
example, IASB has recently agreed to publish near final versions of accounting 
standards so that companies and investors can get an early warning about their 
content.  IASB previously released draft standards for comment,and then sim-
ply put out the final version several months later.  The new arrangements will 
ensure that standards are released in several draft versions, so companies and 
investors can watch the rules as they develop.  IASB will also look at issuing 
discussion papers on controversial accounting issues and do more field testing 
of its proposed standards.118  Further, the IASC Foundation trustees have 
pledged to play a greater role in ensuring that IASB follows due process and 
improves its deliberative procedures.  Such improvements will include measures 
to reduce the cost of involvement in IASB proceedings (e.g., by broadcasting 
IASB meetings over the internet and posting observer notes on the IASB web-
site in advance of Board meetings).  The IASB has also promised to draw more 
 
 116. On Nov. 19, 2004, the European Commission endorsed “95%” of IAS 39 subject to IASB 
review of the “current full fair value option.”  After extensive consultation with the EU Commission, 
IASB published an amended version of IAS 39 on June 16, 2005, which was endorsed by the EU's 
Accounting Regulatory Committee, but formal adoption by the EU has yet to take place.  The current 
position of the Commission toward IASs/IFRSs is available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_ 
market/accounting/ias_en.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2005). 
 117. See Dewing and Russell, supra note 86. 
 118. Andrew Parker, IASB to Improve Consultation Procedures, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at 29. 
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extensively on a wide range of advisory and user groups in the discussions of 
near-final exposure drafts and standards drafts.  Finally, the trustees have also 
agreed to expand their number by offering two more seats to Asian countries.119 
More far-reaching changes are unlikely, however, as a result of structural 
difficulties, that is, the multitude of public-sector principals of the IASB.  Lack 
of a single or primary public principal who could threaten IASB with re-
negotiating the grant of authority (as the SEC can do domestically in the United 
States), leaves the agent with greater freedom of action for at least two reasons:  
First, a setting with many public principals allows the agent to play off one prin-
cipal against another.  Second, such a setting gives rise to the kinds of collective 
action problems that are familiar from the literature on multiple principals.  
Who will engage in proper monitoring of the agent when each principal can 
free-ride on the monitoring performed by others?  Such monitoring would be 
costly, taxing already scarce resources, and requires technical expertise that 
IGOs and transgovernmental organizations may simply not possess.  Maybe 
even more importantly, who can effectively reprimand or punish the agent?  
Any credible threat of taking governance functions away from the agent would, 
at a minimum, require collective action by several international or transgov-
ernmental bodies and would therefore also require a compromise that is costly 
to forge, which only seems likely if the agent greatly diverges from several prin-
cipals’ preferences.  In other words, the structure of multiple principals (exacer-
bated by the sometimes conflicting political agendas among those principals) 
translates into soft constraints on IASB, unless it exercises its power in ways 
that are substantially at odds with the macro-political climate. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
We have sought to advance the debate about global governance and, spe-
cifically, about the potential for a global system of administrative law to ensure 
accountability, transparency, as well as access for those affected by the new in-
ternational and transnational rule- and decisionmaking.  To do so, we have 
conducted a positive political analysis of the delegation of regulatory authority 
to private agents—an issue largely neglected by social scientists but increasingly 
important in the international political economy.  We have focused empirically 
on global governance in accounting, which as of 2001 is the task of the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board, IASB—a private agent, modelled after the 
national accounting standards-setter of the United States, the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board, FASB. 
Our analysis contributes to several ongoing debates about power, institu-
tions, and governance in world politics.  We have found that, when governance 
functions are delegated to private bodies, material resources and technical ex-
 
 119. See INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE FOUNDATION, REVIEW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE (2004). 
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pertise are crucial.  Yet, an analysis of differences in material resources alone is 
not sufficient to understand private governance.  Rather, specific institutional 
arrangements determine which resources give how much power over which is-
sues to a given actor (and vis-à-vis whom).  Consequently, solving any perceived 
problems of accountability, transparency, or access requires understanding 
these institutional arrangements. 
In addition, our research contributes to the burgeoning literature on delega-
tion.  Social scientists who view delegation of public authority as a principal-
agent relationship mostly assume that agents are all alike; the existing literature 
has therefore not systematically examined private agents.  We have shown, 
however, that delegation to private agents is systematically different from dele-
gation to public agents.  We have asked, first, why rulemaking authority may be 
granted or delegated to a private body.  We have found that the general reasons 
for delegating may also motivate delegation to a private agent, but three of 
them provide special incentives for delegating to a private rather than public 
agent: benefiting from prior expertise, maintaining expertise in a complex and 
fast-changing issue area—and shifting responsibility (blame avoidance).  In that 
context, we have formalized with greater precision the conditions under which 
delegation for purposes of blame avoidance is attractive to a political principal, 
refining Morris Fiorina's well-known work on this issue.  Turning to the practice 
of governance once authority is delegated, we have found that, especially when 
delegation of governance functions is motivated by wanting to benefit from the 
agent’s prior expertise, delegation to private agents creates a particular kind of 
multiple principals problem, where the agent ends up with at least two princi-
pals—one public and one private.  We have stipulated that this arrangement 
will advantage the stakeholder group that constitutes the private principal over 
other groups with a stake in the regulatory matter whenever those who consti-
tute the private principal are cohesive amongst themselves yet differ in their 
preferences from the other groups.  The agent’s actions under these conditions 
should be a function of what we call the relative tightness of the competing P-A 
relationships.  This tightness of a P-A relationship depends, in turn, on the ex-
tent to which the agent’s financial and operational viability is dependent on 
each of the principals, as well as on the extent to which the macro-political cli-
mate demands or permits private regulatory authority to be relatively inde-
pendent of public oversight.120  Changes in this broader context, in which any 
particular P-A governance relationship is embedded, can deeply affect the na-
ture of the relationship, not least by creating strong incentives for the adoption 
of administrative law procedures to address concerns about, for instance, un-
equal participation or bias. 
We have examined these issues empirically in an analysis of FASB and a 
briefer analysis of IASB.  Given the novelty of the IASB process, a firm ana-
 
 120. It also is a function of the principals’ monitoring capabilities, which, however, again turns on 
the distribution of technical expertise. 
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lytical grasp of the FASB process is helpful in pondering the trends and chal-
lenges that we may soon observe at the international or transnational level, 
since IASB is modelled after FASB.  Moreover, as we have seen, Anglo-Saxon 
accounting standards experts are particularly influential at the transnational 
level, due to the domestic institutional structure and high concentration of ac-
counting standards expertise in Anglo-Saxon countries; FASB is a central 
player in this world.  This analysis of FASB and IASB, which supports our more 
general theoretical arguments, has a number of important implications for 
global governance and administrative law. 
Self-regulation of socio-economic actors—which is at the heart of delegation 
of regulatory authority to private agents—has a number of advantages.  It en-
sures that the regulated themselves have a voice in drawing up the regulation 
(which, ceteris paribus, should raise compliance), and it may allow them to es-
tablish the most economically efficient means to achieve the regulatory objec-
tive.  These reasons also motivate the private sector to voluntarily supply (re-
sources for) regulatory governance.121  Moreover, private regulatory governance 
makes such governance less costly for the general public, in part because the 
regulated economic actors will themselves provide the expertise that would 
otherwise have to be acquired and maintained by government employees. 
At the same time, private regulatory governance also creates challenges for 
equal access for, and accountability to, all who have a stake in the regulation—
and it may make administrative law procedures less effective than usually pre-
sumed.  When technical expertise is required for effective participation but is 
unevenly distributed across those with a stake in the resulting rules and deci-
sions, those stakeholders will have similarly uneven power in governance unless 
specific steps are taken to institutionally safeguard the interests of those with 
less technical expertise.  We have found that those with the least technical ex-
pertise—namely the users of financial statements (mostly investors, who addi-
tionally face collective action problems)—play hardly any role in the domestic 
and global governance on accounting standards.  This is particularly striking 
since, at least in the United States, public regulatory authority over financial re-
porting was established in the 1930s precisely to safeguard the interests of inves-
tors.  In such situations, some of the procedures of administrative law—such as 
openness of the standards-setting process to input from all interested parties 
during notice-and-comment periods—will, by themselves, do little to improve 
the governance output for the previously disadvantaged group.  Such adminis-
trative law procedures might be instituted with great fanfare in response to a 
shift in what we have called the macro-political climate, but they may be quite 
ineffective. 
 
 121. In addition, suppliers of governance may here, as always, be motivated by a quest for power, 
and private sector providers of governance also seem motivated by the opportunity to keep govern-
ment regulation at bay.  See Tandy and Wilburn, supra note 57, at 48.   Minimizing government in-
volvement appears to be particularly important to the business community in the liberal market econ-
omy of the United States.  See Tim Büthe, The Political Sources of Business Confidence (2002; 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University). 
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In sum, global governance can surely be improved through administrative 
law.  Our findings suggest, however, that an assessment of the likely effective-
ness of specific administrative law measures—that is, their effectiveness in solv-
ing perceived problems rather than in offering symbolic satisfaction to momen-
tary critics—requires careful empirical analysis of the causes of those problems 
in the particular realm of governance that is at stake.  The influence of the 
stakeholders in transnational regulation, for instance, may well be institution-
ally balanced by ensuring effective input from all stakeholders; yet, we caution 
that the nominal establishment of some of the standard procedures to achieve 
such greater balance by itself may not be suitable in the global governance of 
complex, technical issue areas.  At the same time, a number of institutional 
changes and incentives might be quite effective, such as creating an independ-
ent source of information about the private agent's work, or changing the 
agent’s funding structure. 
